A model that recognizes the possibility of total shareholder loss in the aftermath of bankruptcy reveals simultaneously the stock price effects of diversification and of the option to abandon assets to creditors. In essence the model integrates security pricing behavior predicted by the CAPM and by the OPM in a single formula. Results have implications for the valuation of equity and debt securities of firms in distress and of options when underlying cash flows are correlated with the market. The analysis suggests why models that consider only diversification or the option-to-abandon sometimes fail to track the behavior of actual returns.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I am concerned with the impact of contagious bankruptcy risk (bankruptcy being defined as the prospect of shareholders losing their entire stake in a firm) on the valuation of common stock, and in particular with whether the introduction of bankruptcy risk allows combining the effects of diversification and of the option-to-abandon assets to creditors in a single valuation formula.
Contagious bankruptcy is interesting from the standpoint of security prices for two reasons. The first is that contagious bankruptcy risk cannot be diversified away, and therefore investors should demand-and in equilibrium receive-compensation for bearing it. The second reason is that, although risk of total loss is always present, its effects are insufficiently represented in historical stock return files (SHUMWAY, 1997) . Consequently, conventional techniques for gauging the association between firm specific returns and market-wide returns may fail to account appropriately for the risk of total shareholder loss. If bankruptcy risk is not being measured and yet should be priced, valuations made by conventional techniques are incorrect. To the extent markets reject these valuations, predictions made by conventional techniques will fail to track real pricing behavior.
Average bankruptcy risk in the U.S. is not very large. Anticipating results obtained later in the paper, the aggregate risk of default (which is of course higher than risk of total loss) in the U.S. is too small to have a significant impact on security values. But this does not mean that risk of default is too small to matter for all firms. Default risk attains relatively high levels for a significant number of firms: 24% on average over the next twelve months for about one tenth of all firms rated by Moody's. (See Figure 1.) I begin this study by obtaining expressions for systematic risk and expected returns that account for bankruptcy risk. With these expressions I examine the issue of combining the option-to-abandon and diversification effects by contrasting implications of the new valuation formula with those of the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model and with those of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as traditionally applied. The analysis is based on a prototypical firm that raises cash by issuing debt and equity and uses the proceeds to buy productive assets. The firm hopes to generate cash from operations and will be liquidated within one year by distributing all available cash to stakeholders. The basic requirement for embedding option-like behavior within the CAPM is to assume that in some states of the world cash flows will be inadequate to meet obligations to debtholders, and in those states shareholders will walk But another requirement for instilling option-like features in equilibrium prices is to face up to the fact that, given truncated returns, covariation between equity and market returns must be affected by bankruptcy risk as well as by the correlation of operating cash flows with the economy . The only question is how strong is the effect of total losses on that covariation and on systematic risk, not whether the effect exists. Procedures to estimate firm-to-market covariation that ignore bankruptcy risk lead to errors just like trying to estimate a linear regression ignoring that the dependent variable has limited range. This difficulty is not mitigated by the fact that bankruptcy loss is an absorbing state and can be observed just once in a security's lifetime.
Although the model adopted in this paper is a highly streamlined version of reality, it produces a variety of interesting insights that come from the integration of well known aspects of the CAPM and option pricing model (OPM) into a single logical structure. The central result is a security valuation formula that is sensitive simultaneously to the benefits of limited liability and of portfolio diversification.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 motivates the problem. Section 3 provides a formal analysis of the model. Section 4 examines stock return anomalies by contrasting the revised and traditional approaches. Section 5 proposes feasible estimators for systematic risk that account for bankruptcy risk. Section 6 reviews the implications of the model and section 7 concludes.
TWO EXPERIMENTS AND THE MODELING FRAMEWORK 2.1 General Idea
In order to illustrate the impact of bankruptcy risk on estimates of fair stock prices I generate simulated equity and market returns, record a return of -100% when the business fails, and then compute regression coefficients with and without total losses in the sample. Repeating this for different degrees of bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity gives a rough idea of the magnitude and direction of latent errors in conventional estimates of systematic risk. Since these simulations set the stage for a formal analysis of the problem, I preface them with a minimum set of necessary assumptions and definitions.
Imagine a risky enterprise that carries debt, functions in a single-period economy where the premises of the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM apply, and whose prospective operating cash flows are correlated with market returns. To assume that the enterprise is risky means that operating cash flows cannot be predicted with certainty. To assume it carries debt implies that, if there is insufficient cash when payments to creditors come due, the firm will declare bankruptcy and all available cash will be transferred to creditors. Finally, supposing that cash flows are correlated with the market implies that the likelihood of total loss to shareholders depends jointly on the firm's operating risk, financial risk (leverage), and on the market's performance, i.e., bankruptcy risk has both idiosyncratic and systematic components by design.
The Firm
Let the firm own assets capable of generating net operating cash flows X (a random variable with support on the set of real numbers) within one year. After one year existing assets are converted into cash and distributed to the firm's owners and creditors. There are no taxes. If the sum of principal and interest on loans-denoted d-exceeds the realized value of X , the firm is bankrupt. (Since the model has but a single period and all claims are settled at the end of that period, it does not distinguish between financial distress, default and bankruptcy, and bankruptcy implies complete loss of shareholders' investment.) Bankruptcy is costless, which means that in the event of bankruptcy the entire cash balance goes to the firm's creditors. Let E X stand for the payoff to shareholders (dividends.) Under limited liability E X is determined as follows:
The Firm and the Market
The one-year return on the market portfolio ( m R ) has a joint bivariate normal distribution with the net operating cash flows generated by the business ( X ). r  with correlation coefficient  such that 11      , i.e., correlation between the firm and the market is never perfect. Also, the likelihood of m R being lower than -100% is insignificant.
2 I refer to the standard deviation of cash flows ( 0 X   ) as "operating risk" and to the correlation between cash flows and market returns (  ) as "market sensitivity," or just "sensitivity." Assuming that X is correlated with m R implies that bankruptcy risk is conditional on the market's performance, is contagious, and therefore must be priced. There exists abundant evidence that historical failure rates are indeed associated with the state of the economy (HELWEGE; KLEIMAN, 1997; MOODY'S, 2000; HILLEGEIST et al., 2004; VASSALOU; XING, 2004) . Bankruptcy risk, designated p, is uniquely determined by expected cash flows, operating risk, and financial leverage (
where:
is the standard normal cumulative probability function; and
 is the standard normal density function.
The probability of avoiding bankruptcy is defined as
Expression (2) establishes a one-to-one relationship between the probability of bankruptcy and  . Financial risk (the numerator in  ) increases as leverage increases. Operating risk (the denominator in  ) increases with the variability of net operating cash flows.

will underestimate required rates of return (and overvalue common stock) when bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity are within the assumed ranges. After observing that a firm's OLS beta can be a significantly biased estimate of true beta it is natural to ask whether a portfolio's OLS beta would also be vulnerable to bias. Portfolios play a central role in tests of the CAPM because they minimize noise in beta. Since the chance of a portfolio returning 100%  drops sharply as the number of securities in the portfolio increases (even if the portfolio contains only very distressed securities), intuition suggests that the truncation effect on portfolio beta should be immaterial. But the simple algebra of portfolio beta indicates otherwise. Portfolio beta is a value-weighted average of the true betas of all securities in the portfolio. The usual estimator of portfolio beta is also a value-weighted average of the estimators of firm-specific betas, but only if all possible outcomes are included in the data.  ) for portfolio sizes between 1 and 20 are given in Table 2 . As expected, the standard deviations of both true and OLS beta fall quickly as the number of securities in the portfolio increases, with about three quarters of the total reduction obtained with No doubt one can contrive scenarios in which portfolio betas are less affected by bias than individual securities by combining positive and negative biases. However, according to the formal analysis of the model in the next section of the paper, if bankruptcy risk is in the 0-25% range and sensitivity is less than .7, then all firm-specific OLS betas will underestimate true beta and so will portfolio OLS beta regardless of how many securities are in the portfolio. 
FORMAL ANALYSIS
The Monte Carlo experiments above illustrate the impact of total losses in the calculation of firm-specific and portfolio betas and encourage a deeper discussion of valuation errors caused by overlooking bankruptcy risk. In order to do this successfully we need formal expressions for beta, expected returns and value of common stock. As a first step in this direction I take a closer look at the expected payout to shareholders, a key input in formulas (5) and (6) and for shareholder returns (9).
Expected Payoff to Shareholders
Intuitively expected dividends should go down with leverage ceteris paribus (because more leverage implies less of the same cash flows are available for shareholders) and rise with operating risk (because limited liability implies that any expansion in the upside is not entirely offset by the corresponding downside expansion.) Lemma 1 confirms this intuition, which is portrayed in Figure 3 . LEMMA 1. The expected value and standard deviation of dividends are determined by X  (operating risk) and  as follows: 
Covariance of Cash Flows and Market Returns
The covariance between dividends ( E X ) and market returns ( m R ) under limited liability is a key input both in the certainty-equivalent valuation formula (6) and in the closed-form expression for systematic risk to be obtained later on. In a large economy the range of variation in market returns is not much affected by what happens to a single firm, but the range of variation in a firm's dividends is strongly curtailed by limited liability as the likelihood of 
Combining Lemma 2 (bankruptcy risk attenuates the covariance between dividends and market returns) with the fact that stock returns and dividends are positively related, does not imply that bankruptcy risk attenuates beta. In fact the opposite happens as we will see in Proposition II later on.
Stock Returns
The relationship between bankruptcy risk and stock returns is at the center of a vital research effort motivated by questions such as: -Do investors expect relatively higher or lower returns from stock in distressed firms (DICHEV, 1998; VASSALOU; XING 2004) ? Or the opposite question: -How can historical stock return patterns be used to assess the likelihood of bankruptcy (Hillegeist et al. 2004 )? Another fruitful line of inquiry was prompted by the finding that anomalous patterns in the cross-section of stock returns that had been attributed to size and leverage are effectively subsumed by bankruptcy risk (CHAN; CHEN 1991). These questions are related to the basic issue of what determines the distribution of stock returns. In terms of the model in Section 2, do expected cash flows, operating risk, leverage and market sensitivity affect stock returns, and if so, how? The answer is given in Proposition I.
PROPOSITION I. 
The only firm-specific characteristics that affect equity beta are p and .
Proposition I suggests the elements of an explanation for why distress subsumes the effects of size and leverage in CAPM anomalies. It also suggests an explanation for why longrun stock returns on distressed firms can be lower than those on healthy firms (DICHEV, 1998) by emphasizing that market sensitivity also matters in the determination of systematic risk.
True Beta
I use the qualifier "true" to distinguish the value of beta which takes into account the possibility of bankruptcy from its ordinary least squares proxy. According to the CAPM, beta measures risk that cannot be diversified away in a portfolio and therefore should be priced. This is the essence of expression (3), which states that investors expect the riskless rate plus beta times the market premium when buying common stock. According to the corollary to Proposition I true beta depends only on bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity, besides the usual market parameters. The next proposition adds a closed-form expression for computing true beta.
PROPOSITION II. True equity beta is determined by bankruptcy risk, sensitivity and the market's parameters as follows: (Table 3 shows theoretical values of  E for selected values of p and ρ.) Observe that  E increases with ρ, given p and increases with p, given ρ. This agrees with intuition and is confirmed by a formal analysis of partial derivatives. The multiple connections of  E with leverage, operating risk and market sensitivity embedded in Proposition II are well documented in the literature (Bowman 1979; Mandelker and Ghon Rhee 1984) .
A recently observed aspect of the connection between bankruptcy risk and  E is that there have been times when firms with high bankruptcy risk persistently yielded stock returns that are lower than average market-wide returns (Dichev 1998) . This seems to contradict the CAPM. 
However, according to Proposition II, the effect on  E of increasing distress levels depends on market sensitivity. (See Figure 4. ) If in Dichev's sample sensitivity is sufficiently smaller for the most distressed firms, then the finding that returns on distressed portfolios are lower than returns on healthy portfolios does not contradict the CAPM. 
Fair Value of Equity
In order to obtain a valuation formula for common stock that reflects jointly the benefits of diversification and of the "option to abandon" I substitute in (5) expressions for expected dividends and expected returns that consider the risk of bankruptcy loss to shareholders. The 
CAPM vs. OPM
The most interesting aspect of Proposition III is that it incorporates in a single formula both the diversification and the option features of common stock. This can be seen by comparing the value of common stock as given by the CAPM (expression 15) with the value of common stock according to the option pricing model. For the firm described in Section 2, the value of equity according to the Black-Scholes option pricing model is:
where A V is the value of the firm's assets (the "underlying"), and A R  is the standard deviation of asset returns ("volatility").  on the value of equity is positive, but the indirect effect could lead to a negative overall impact on the value of equity (BREALEY et al., 2006.) As seen in panel 6.2, once again the two valuations are not identical:
OPM E V is slightly higher than CAPM E V at low volatilities. As volatility rises (along with bankruptcy risk) the situation reverses and the gap continues to expand from then on. The explanation for the "U"-shaped equity value curve is given from different perspectives by the OPM and by the CAPM. According to the OPM the effect of falling underlying asset prices (panel 6.3) is initially stronger than the effect of increasing volatility, but the situation eventually reverses. According to the CAPM the effect of increasing beta (panel 6.4) is initially stronger than the effect of increasing expected dividends, but the situation eventually reverses. Figures 5 and 6 show that valuation formula (15) is sensitive to the shareholder benefits of both diversification and limited liability (the option effect). Discrepancies between the CAPM and OPM valuation formulas (15 and 19) are caused by different assumptions regarding the behavior of dividends. The CAPM (as applied in this paper) assumes that dividends follow a normal distribution truncated below at zero (the event "zero dividends" having positive probability equal to p) and that the variance of asset prices changes as asset prices change. The OPM assumes that asset prices follow a lognormal distribution (the event "zero dividends" having probability zero) and that the variance of asset prices is invariant with respect to asset 
Conditional Expected Returns
According to the CAPM the unconditional expected return on equity is given by
  with the impact of bankruptcy risk given by Proposition II. Sometimes it is necessary to compute expected returns conditional on a given value of the market return, for example, when measuring investment performance by means of abnormal returns on equity (GRINBLATT; TITMAN, 1994; BREALEY et al., 2006) . What is the correct manner of revising expected returns once we know that the realized value of m R turned out to be ˆm r ? Intuitively as long as operating cash flows and market returns are correlated ( 0   ) the answer should not be obtained simply by replacing ˆm r for m r in (4) because knowledge of what happened to the market is useful for updating the firm's risk of bankruptcy loss and expected dividends. The correct way of computing the expected return on equity conditional on the market's outcome is given in Proposition IV, after preliminary results in Lemmas 3, 4 and 5. 
LEMMA 5. The ratio of conditional to unconditional expected dividends is:
We are now ready to obtain an expression for conditional expected returns on equity that uses all information about the firm contained in the fact that . The relationship portayed in Figure 7 shows that even though the level of return on the market at which the firm's stock hits the lower bound is too low to be realistic, respecting the lower bound affects conditional expected returns over the entire range of market returns.
CONSEQUENCES OF IGNORING BANKRUPTCY RISK
According to Proposition II, beta is determined by two, and only two, firm-specific parameters: bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity. In practice beta is typically estimated by regressing historical rates of return on market rates of return using ordinary least squares (OLS). This section examines the consequences of ignoring the possibility of total losses when estimating beta.
Impact on Estimates of Beta
To examine the possibility of bias in traditional OLS estimates of beta I derive an expression for the covariance to variance ratio assuming that total losses are not recorded in the estimation sample. In other words, since OLS is employed to estimate the covariance to variance ratio as if all possible outcomes were available, what the conventional technique actually measures is the covariance to variance ratio conditional on total loss not happening, which means that:
The next proposition offers an expression for OLS E  in terms of fundamental parameters of the firm and market.
PROPOSITION V. The OLS estimator of equity beta conditional on total loss not happening can be written as a function of two, and only two, firm-specific parameters-bankruptcy and sensitivity-and the usual market parameters as follows:
Figure 8 contains parameters required rates of return would be understated by more than half a percentage point (about 62 basis points.)
Impact on Estimates of Required Returns
To what extent are analysts who overlook the possibility of total losses surprised by actual returns? The answer to this question depends on whether the analyst presumably knows or does not know the actual market yield.
Assume first that the analyst is unsure about the actual market return ( 
Now assume that the analyst knows 
PROPOSED ESTIMATORS FOR BETA
In this section I propose two estimators for beta designed to address problems in the conventional OLS estimator. The first finds both p and  endogenously. The second needs an exogenous estimate of p.
First Proposed Estimator: Endogenous p and 
Estimation of beta from stock returns does not fit the typical assumptions of censored or truncated regressions, which involve the estimation of parameters of an originally unconstrained distribution given a censored or truncated sample drawn from that same distribution. The problem at hand consists in estimating the parameters of a distribution of originally constrained returns. In particular, we must estimate the parameters of a truncated bivariate normal distribution given observations that exclude instances in which the lower bound was reached. Since bankruptcy risk and sensitivity are the key parameters of stock return distributions (Proposition I) and beta is a function exclusively of those two firm-specific parameters (Proposition II), the strategy is to obtain maximum-likelihood estimates of p and  from a sample of stock and market returns, which then lead to a maximum-likelihood The objective function and one of the constraints are nonlinear in p and ρ. Once the solutions p and  are found the maximum-likelihood estimate of beta follows from Proposition II. (14) as before. This estimator should perform well for companies that have been through significant changes in failure risk, while market sensitivity has remained relatively steady. An independent assessment of p can be obtained by means of a bankruptcy prediction model such as Shumway's (2001) . The first proposed estimator for beta has the advantage of following entirely from the CAPM, but the final result is based on possibly stale historical returns (like the traditional estimator). The second proposed estimator needs input from outside the realm of the CAPM and stock returns, but in so doing allows the introduction of recent information on bankruptcy risk. . Deriving sensitivity given OLS beta and probability of bankruptcy.
Second Proposed Estimator: Exogenous

CONCLUSION
Combining the effects of diversification and of the option-to-abandon in a single valuation model suggests reasons for anomalies in models that concentrate on only one of those two factors. If total loss is possible and the likelihood of total loss is correlated with the market, then the systematic risk of equity must reflect this possibility. Even if the effect of total loss is too small to matter for most firms most of the time, it can still be sufficiently large for enough firms to generate return patterns that seem strange to those who ignore it. For instance, return patterns in which smaller firms accrue higher returns than predicted by the CAPM and in which these higher returns are associated with financial distress. Although this commentary on conventional techniques applies at any level of risk, significant practical effects are foreseen only for highly speculative investments (such as firms classified as Caa-C by Moody's).
The argument in the paper is consistent with accepted finance theory in the sense that: (1) it replicates Black and Scholes' option-equity parallel; (2) it assumes a linear relationship between expected returns and beta given the expected return on the market; and (3) it respects Modigliani and Miller's proposition on capital structure irrelevance in a tax free/costless bankruptcy economy. The paper challenges, however, the presumption that there is a linear relationship between expected returns and beta given the realized market return and the practice of estimating systematic risk via ordinary least squares.
Other results are:
• Option prices should be affected by the systematic risk of their underlying assets, in agreement with existing empirical results (Dennis and Mayhew 2002; Duan and Wei 2006) .
• Expected stock returns conditional on the actual market return depend in a nonlinear fashion on the actual market return and converge to 100%  as the market return drops. This contrasts with the conventional approach in which the ex-post expected return is obtained by substituting the actual market return for the expected market return in the formula for the exante expectation (the Jensen measure).
• Two characteristics are sufficient to specify the distribution of stock returns: bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity. Bankruptcy risk subsumes the effects of leverage, size and operating risk on returns. This agrees with research that finds that the size and leverage anomalies in CAPM are subsumed by distress (CHAN; CHEN, 1991; FRENCH, 1993 FAMA; FRENCH, 1996; VASSALOU; XING, 2004 ).
• Two firm-specific characteristics are sufficient to specify beta: bankruptcy risk and market sensitivity. Bankruptcy risk in the model is partly systematic, in agreement with findings from contingent claims based estimates of default risk (VASSALOU; XING 2004), but not with findings from accounting based estimates of default risk (DICHEV, 1998) . Very distressed firms may have lower betas than very safe firms as long as high distress is accompanied by sufficiently low sensitivity levels. Hence, despite claims made elsewhere (DICHEV, 1998) , the CAPM is not negated by very distressed firms yielding lower returns than very safe firms, even if this persists over long periods of time.
Allowing for risk of contagious bankruptcy has important but subtle effects on security prices. The model presented in this paper integrates aspects of the CAPM and OPM. It leads to predictions similar to those generated by traditional implementations of the Sharpe-LintnerMossin CAPM when bankruptcy risk is irrelevant, but to a different and richer set of predictions when bankruptcy risk is important. N=25 and N=500 securities at selected levels of sensitivity () and bankruptcy risk (p).
